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ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LAW
VOLUME 13 SUMMER 2011 NUMBER 4
Is Online Copyright Enforcement
Scalable?
Annemarie Bridy*
An algorithm, design, networking protocol, program, or other system is said to scale if it
is suitably efficient and practical when applied to large situations If the design fails
when the quantity increases then it does not scale. -Wikipedia
ABSTRACT
This Article examines P2P file sharing and the copyright
enforcement problem it has created through the lens of scalability. Part
I traces the evolution of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks from Napster to
BitTorrent, with a focus on the relative scalability of successive
architectures. Part II takes up the difficult question of the scale of P2P
infringement and its harms, examining the strategic number-
crunching that underlies industry data on piracy, the government's
credulous acceptance of that data, and the risk of letting industry
hyperbole drive copyright policy and law enforcement priorities. Part
III evaluates the efficacy of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) as a policy mechanism for scaling up online copyright
enforcement. I argue in Part III that the DMCA has proven to be
remarkably scalable for enforcing copyrights in hosted content but has
altogether failed to scale in the context of P2P file sharing, leading to
the dysfunctional workaround of mass John Doe litigation. Part IV
weighs the costs and benefits of more scalable alternatives to mass
litigation, including a potential amendment of the DMCA's pre-
litigation subpoena provision and a pair of administrative dispute
resolution systems-one hypothetical, the other real-for streamlining
adjudication of P2P infringement claims.
*D 2011 Annemarie Bridy. Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of
Law. The Author would like to thank Steve Hetcher, Daniel Gervais, and the staff of the
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LAW for organizing and hosting the
Symposium for which this Article was prepared. I am also grateful to my fellow Symposium
participants for their engaging presentations and to James Grimmelmann and David Post for
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In 1969, the computer network that would eventually become
the Internet consisted of exactly four nodes-two on campuses in the
University of California system, one at Stanford University, and one
at the University of Utah.' By 1989, the total number of nodes on the
Internet had increased to 130,000.2 By 1999, that number had grown
to 56,218,000, and by 2009 it had reached 681,064,561.3 In the
1. DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON'S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 30 (2009).
2. Internet Host Count History, INTERNET SYSTEMS CONSORTIUM, http://www.isc.org/
solutions/survey/history (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). The ISC counts hosts by counting the
number of IP addresses that have been assigned a domain name. See ISC Internet Domain
Survey Background, INTERNET SYSTEMS CONSORTIUM, http://www.isc.org/solutions/survey/
background (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
3. Internet Host Count History, supra note 2.
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roughly forty years since its inception, the Internet has doubled in size
approximately every fourteen months.4 It is now over 170 million
times bigger than its original size-an astonishing growth rate by any
metric. As David Post has observed, growing a network to such a size
at such a rate is no easy feat: "Turning Small into Big," he explains,
"can be a tricky proposition indeed, because scaling problems-the
problems that arise solely as a consequence of increasing size or
increasing numbers-can be profound, and profoundly difficult to
solve."5
To make a long (and technically complicated) story short, the
Internet's designers solved the problem of scale by decentralizing the
transmission of data and distributing it in tiny packets throughout the
entire network.6 Because the routing function is parceled out to
machines across the network, data transmission gets done much more
efficiently than it would if all of the data were passing through a
single, central hub. 7 As the saying goes, many hands make light work.
Another key to the Internet's scalability is its capacity to grow from
any point on the network. To quote Post again, "centralized networks
grow radially-outward from the center, like a starfish; there's only so
fast they can grow, because the center has to 'keep up' with the whole
network."" The Internet, by contrast, "grows like a bush, each of
whose terminal twigs can sprout new twigs, or like a coral reef; every
machine already on the network . . . can serve as the point of
attachment for a machine or machines joining the network."9 Because
the Internet can grow out from any node, "as the network grows, its
ability to grow grows."10 The bigger it gets, the bigger it can keep
getting."
Although its size (measured in terms of the aggregate number
of nodes it interconnects) is certainly impressive, the true miracle of
the Internet is its unprecedented capacity to move data fast, far, and
4. POST, supra note 1, at 44.
5. Id. at 60.
6. Id. at 73.
7. Id. at 75.
8. Id. at 76.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 78.
11. Despite its prodigious (and always increasing) size, though, the Internet is
surprisingly navigable. In 1998, Albert-Liszl6 Barabasi and two of his graduate students at
Notre Dame set out to determine how many degrees of separation there were between any two
documents on the World Wide Web. See ALBERT-LASZL6 BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE
OF NETWORKS 34 (2002). They concluded that there was an average distance of only 19 "clicks"
between any two randomly chosen URLs. See id. This high degree of connectivity means that the
Internet, the world's largest network, is actually classifiable as a small-world network. See id. at
31.
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wide. The trouble this capacity has caused for the owners of
copyrights in digitally reproducible music and films is well known. In
the process of solving one tricky problem of scale, it turns out, the
Internet created another, commonly referred to in the court pleadings
of copyright industry plaintiffs as "massive infringement."12 How to
approach solving that problem of scale, if indeed it can be solved, is
the subject of this Article.
Part I traces the evolution of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks from
Napster to BitTorrent, with a focus on the relative scalability of
successive architectures. Part II takes up the difficult question of the
scale of P2P infringement and its harms, examining the strategic
number-crunching that underlies industry data on piracy, the
government's credulous acceptance of that data, and the risk of letting
industry hyperbole drive copyright policy and law enforcement
priorities. Part III evaluates the efficacy of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) as a policy mechanism for scaling up online
copyright enforcement without hampering the growth of Internet
services and applications. I argue in Part III that the DMCA has
proven remarkably scalable for enforcing copyrights in hosted content,
but has altogether failed to scale in the context of P2P file sharing,
leading to the dysfunctional workaround of mass John Doe litigation.
Part IV weighs the costs and benefits of more scalable alternatives to
mass litigation, including a potential amendment to the DMCA's pre-
litigation subpoena provision and a pair of administrative dispute
resolution systems--one hypothetical, the other real-for streamlining
adjudication of P2P infringement claims.
I. THE SCALABILITY OF P2P NETWORKS
A. The Evolution of P2P Architectures: Both a Client and a Server Be
Like the Internet itself, P2P file-sharing networks scale well by
eschewing centralization and distributing workload. 13 In a traditional
12. See, e.g., Zomba Recording LLC v. Chen, No. 5:08cv00698, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33364, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y Apr. 15, 2009) ('This case is one of many similar cases being litigated
throughout the country, in which groups of record companies have sued individuals in an
attempt to combat and deter what they perceive as massive copyright infringement over the
[I]nternet."); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(describing LimeWire as "the operator of a peer-to-peer network that was and is, in each record
company's respective judgment, a notorious vehicle for massive copyright infringement"); MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("The complaint alleged
that Defendants' file sharing software contributed to massive infringement of copyrighted works
owned by Plaintiffs.").
13. See Yung-Ming Li et al., Analysis of Scale Effects in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 16
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 590, 590 (2008) ("P2P technologies have many
[Vol. 13:4:695698
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client-server network, the more demands there are on the server from
individual clients, the fewer resources are available to the rest of the
network. 14 If there is too much demand at any given time, the server
will crash, and clients will no longer be able to obtain content at all.'5
P2P networks improve on the client-server model by decentralizing
distribution, claiming bandwidth from edge nodes to transmit data,
and thereby avoiding congestion at dedicated servers. 16 The more peer
nodes there are on a P2P network at any given time, the greater the
network's total capacity.17
The Napster file-sharing service, which launched the P2P
phenomenon, maintained a central server for indexing purposes, but
no files were actually stored on or transferred through it.18 Queries
were routed through the central server, which performed a
matchmaking function between peers on the network, but the file
transfers themselves were unmediated.19  Subsequent file-sharing
systems, including FastTrack (used by Grokster and KaZaA) and
Gnutella (used by Morpheus and LimeWire), further decentralized
their architectures by eliminating the central indexing server.20 To
operational characteristics that make them appealing. First, they rely on peer nodes, not the
central servers, to deliver content and therefore are more scalable."); Stephanos Androutsellis-
Theotokis & Diomidis Spinellis, A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Content Distribution Technologies, 36
ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 335, 336 (2004) ("[P2P] architectures are generally characterized by
the direct sharing of computer resources (CPU cycles, storage, content) rather than requiring the
intermediation of a centralized server . . . . Such architectures typically have as inherent
characteristics scalability, resistance to censorship and centralized control, and increased access
to resources.").
14. See, e.g., Shirshanka Das et al., The Case for Servers in a Peer-to-Peer World, 36
ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 335 (2004), (pointing out that "[t]raditional client-server
architectures are known to be ineffective in handling large correlated bursts of user demands");
Lei Liu, et al., Experimental Investigation of a Peer-to-Peer-Based Architecture for Emerging
Consumer Grid Applications, 1 J. OPT. COMMUN. NETW. 57 (2009) (citing poor scalability and low
efficiency with increasing numbers of users as negative attributes of client-server networks).
15. Li et al., supra note 14, at 590-91 (describing the "flash crowd" effect, in which very
large numbers of users all attempt to download a popular file at the same time, causing the
server hosting the file to crash).
16. Id. at 590.
17. Id. (explaining that "the effective bandwidth [of a P2P network] is scalable with
respect to the number of active users"). Note that the term "peer" in the technical literature on
P2P file sharing refers not to the user of the networked computer, but rather to the computer
itself.
18. See generally A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Software located on the Napster servers maintains a 'search index' of Napster's collective
directory.").
19. See id. at 1012 (describing the architecture of the Napster system).
20. See generally MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 921-922 (2005)
(describing the architecture of the FastTrack and Gnutella networks and their relationship to
defendants Grokster and Morpheus); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d
481, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that LimeWire software provides access to the Gnutella
P2P networks); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, No. 07-3705, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91585, at
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improve search efficiency without creating a bottleneck at a central
indexing server, FastTrack employed mini-indexing servers, called
supernodes, dispersed throughout the network, which were
responsible for indexing the contents of nodes connected to them. 21
Supernodes were designated as such for their greater bandwidth and
processing power relative to other peers on the network.22 Gnutella,
which did not employ supernodes, was a truly distributed P2P system,
routing queries through the network from one node to the next until a
node storing the desired file could be located. 23 Gnutella's purely
decentralized architecture entailed longer search and discovery times
than FastTrack's hybrid architecture and was therefore less
efficient. 24
Although all of these P2P networks distributed the task of
transferring data, enabling every peer to function as both a client and
a server, they still suffered from inefficiencies and asymmetries
created by free riding.25 For example, one study of Gnutella found
that 70 percent of nodes on the network downloaded content without
ever uploading any.2 6 From the point of view of scalability, free riding
on a P2P network is doubly problematic: Not only does it decrease
overall content availability, it also increases the workload for the
nodes that do upload content. 27 Free riding thus produces a "tragedy
of the digital commons" and effectively transforms a P2P network into
a bastardized client-server network, in which some nodes decline to
serve any content and act only as clients. 28 The network gets bigger
without getting any richer, and its workload is poorly distributed.
B. BitTorrent: Better Scaling Through Enforced Sharing
The BitTorrent file-sharing protocol, first released in 2001,
solved the problem of P2P free riding quite elegantly-by making it
*3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009) (explaining that KaZaA software provides access to the FastTrack
P2P network).
21. See id. at 921. Search bottlenecks, albeit less severe ones than occur at a central
indexing server, also occur at supernodes in a hybrid P2P network. See Liu, et al., supra note 14,
at 596. Li and his co-authors found that search congestion is the primary factor restricting the
scalability of P2P networks. See id. at 600.
22. Androutsellis-Theotokis & Spinellis, supra note 13, at 346.
23. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 922.
24. Androutsellis-Theotokis & Spinellis, supra note 13, at 346.
25. Liu et al., supra note 14, at 590.
26. Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, FIRST MONDAY
(Oct. 2, 2000), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/792/701.
27. Liu et al., supra note 14, at 590.
28. Adar & Huberman, supra note 26 (explaining that free-riding degrades the entire
performance of the network and effectively transforms non-free-riding nodes into centralized
servers).
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architecturally impossible for any peer on the network to take without
giving. 29 The architecture of BitTorrent, like that of FastTrack, is a
hybrid P2P model.30 File transfers occur strictly among peers, but the
process requires occasional interaction with a server, called a tracker,
which helps peers locate other peers offering desired content.31 The
collectivity of peers sharing a particular file at a given time according
to instructions received from the tracker is called a torrent or swarm. 32
In each torrent, there are two types of peers-leechers and seeds. 33 A
leecher is a peer in the process of acquiring a file.34 A seed is a peer
that already has a complete copy of the file and that remains in the
torrent to serve the leechers. 35 Every torrent requires at least one
seed. 36
When a leecher requests a file, the tracker sends that peer a
list of other peers, usually numbering about fifty, that are already
active in the torrent transferring the requested file.37 Of the fifty
peers, the leecher adds about twenty to forty as its neighbors.38 The
leecher downloads fixed-size pieces of the requested file from these
neighbors, as well as from the seed. Each leecher usually serves four
neighboring peers at a time.39 As a leecher acquires new content, it
simultaneously shares its content with other leechers in the torrent. 40
Unlike a client-server network, which bogs down as traffic increases,
as a torrent grows, the aggregate network bandwidth of the torrent
also grows.41 For each peer in the torrent, data transfer rates are
much faster than they would be in a client-server environment. 42
29. See Christopher D. Carothers et al., A Case Study in Modeling Large-Scale Peer-to-
Peer File sharing Networks Using Discrete-Event Simulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2006
MODELING AND SIMULATION SYMPOSIUM (2006), available at http://www.cs.rpi.edul-chrisc/
publications/carothers-emss-2006.pdf ("What makes BitTorrent so unique compared to past
efforts is that it provides a built in mechanism to ensure the fair distribution of content and
prevents selfishness on the part of peers using game theoretical 'tit-for-tat' piece distribution
algorithms.").
30. Raymond Lei Xia & Jogesh K. Muppala, A Survey of Bit Torrent Performance, 12
IEEE COMMS. & TUTORIALS 140, 141 (2010).
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Moreover, there is no denial of service on the part of an overburdened
central server, and no single source of content is overtaxed. 43
To keep the torrent operating at maximum capacity, the
BitTorrent protocol uses a process called pipelining.44 Every active
peer in a torrent maintains a continuously refreshed queue of requests
for pieces, so that no connection is ever left idle after any one piece is
downloaded.45 Each peer keeps track of the download rate it gets from
the other peers it serves and preferentially uploads to the peers giving
it the best download rates.46 Every ten seconds, a peer reassesses the
download rates it gets from the peers to which it is connected, and if
another neighboring peer offers a better download rate, it temporarily
chokes off the stingy peer and opens up a connection to the more
generous one.47 This "tit for tat" mechanism ensures that peers
offering little or nothing to the torrent will get little or nothing from
it.48
Although BitTorrent's mandatory sharing functionality
increases efficiency and scalability, the protocol is not without
inefficiencies. One major problem in terms of optimizing network
resources is that BitTorrent "neighbors" are neighbors in name only;
the protocol selects them randomly rather than based on their
proximity to the requesting user.49 This location-unaware selection
mechanism prolongs download times and over-consumes bandwidth.50
While the former problem may represent little more than an
inconvenience to users, the latter is a source of loud complaint from
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which have controversially resorted
to bandwidth-shaping to limit the load of BitTorrent traffic on their
networks.5 1 For ISPs, then, as well as copyright owners, the scaling
43. Id.
44. Xia & Muppala, supra note 30, at 141.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 142.
47. Id.
48. See id. ('This mechanism is very important to encourage contributors and punish
free-riders, thus preventing leechers from downloading without contributing anything."). But see
id. at 145 (citing a study by Andrade et al., which concluded that although the tit-for-tat protocol
discourages free-riding successfully, the mechanism may not work as well if there is a large
number of seeds in the torrent).
49. See id. at 140 (identifying BitTorrent's random neighbor selection mechanism as one
of the most widely criticized aspects of the protocol).
50. Id. see also Sixto Ortiz, Jr., Proponents Try to Rehabilitate Peer-to-Peer Technology,
41 IEEE COMPUTER 16, 17 (2008) ("Currently, P2P services don't generally calculate the best
route to use to transmit data and thus sometimes use peers that are far from one another,
increasing latency and bandwidth consumption.").
51. See generally Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won't Behave: Regulating P2P in
the Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 598-600 (2009) [hereinafter Bridy, Pirates]
(discussing the Comcast torrent throttling controversy). Although the FCC sanctioned Comcast
[Vol. 13:4:695702
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up of BitTorrent networks has come at a price, though lack of reliable
data makes it difficult to know how high a price or exactly how high a
proportion of overall network traffic P2P transfers represent. 52
One study conducted from 2008 to 2009, which did not include
ISPs in the United States, concluded that P2P traffic generated the
highest percentage of overall network traffic in all regions studied,
ranging from 43 percent in Northern Africa to 70 percent in Eastern
Europe.53 (These percentages were down from a previous study in
2007, but the absolute volume of P2P traffic did not decline.) 54 The
same study found that BitTorrent dominated all other protocols,
including HTTP, the protocol that carries ordinary web-browsing
traffic.55 A 2009 study of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) traffic on a
major European ISP found the percentage of P2P traffic to be much
lower-roughly 14 percent.56 The authors of the 2009 study also
found, however, that P2P users have longer sessions than non-P2P
users, and that a larger percentage of P2P users are always
connected.57 This pair of findings from the 2009 study suggests that
P2P users are more demanding of resources than their non-P2P
counterparts.
To make the BitTorrent protocol even more efficient and less
bandwidth intensive, computer scientists have been working on design
for discriminating against traffic solely on the basis of protocol, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit subsequently overturned the sanction, holding that the FCC is without jurisdiction
to regulate traffic management by cable broadband providers. See Comcast Corp. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 600 F.3d 642, 650 (2010); Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the
Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 112-14 (2010)
[hereinafter Bridy, Response] (discussing the regulatory state of play for wire line broadband
providers following the D.C. Circuit's decision in Comcast).
52. See Bridy, Pirates, supra note 51, at 597 n.171 (discussing the difficulty of
ascertaining how much network congestion is caused by P2P traffic); see also Peter J. Sevcik,
Peer-to-Peer Traffic: Another Internet Myth is Born, BUS. COMMS. REV., Nov. 1, 2005, at 2,
available at http://www.netforecast.com/Articles/BCR%20C42%2OPeer-to-Peer%20Traffic.pdf
(trying to assess the validity of a claim that P2P transfers accounted for 60% of all ISP traffic
and concluding that "there is enough conflicting data and confusion over how to measure and
report the data that no general conclusions should be drawn.").
53. HENDRIK SCHULZE & KLAUS MOCHALSKI, IPOQUE INTERNET STUDY 2008/2009, at 2
(2009), available at http://www.ipoque.com/userfiles/file/ipoque-Internet-Study-08-09.pdf. The
authors found significant differences over the eight regions that were studied: Northern Africa,
Southern Africa, Middle East, Southern Europe, Southwestern Europe, and Germany. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 2 (reporting the percentage decline from 2007); id. at 5 (explaining that the
percentage decline was not matched by a decline in absolute volume, because other protocols
experienced percentage increases over the same period).
55. Id. at 5.
56. Gregor Maier et al., On Dominant Characteristics of Residential Broadband
Internet Traffic, in IMC '09: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 ACM SIGCOMM INTERNET
MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE (2009), available at http://www.icir.org/gregor/papers/imc09-
residential-traffic.pdf (finding that HTTP traffic, not P2P traffic, dominates).
57. Id. at 92.
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modifications that localize peer selection and introduce other resource-
saving mechanisms, including more efficient file location, into the
architecture.58 In addition, a consortium of major telecommunications
providers and P2P companies-the P4P Working Group-was formed
in 2007 to improve resource utilization on P2P networks by promoting
real-time communication between P2P applications and the ISP
infrastructures on which they run.5 9 With improved communication
between P2P applications and ISP networks, the need for ISPs to
resort to extreme traffic management measures like throttling or
protocol blocking can be diminished, and the legitimate commercial
potential of P2P as a means of content distribution can be realized.
C. P2P Past Its Peak: The Recentralization of Online Infringement
While studies attempting to measure P2P traffic reach
different conclusions on the numbers, they agree that recent traffic
trends show more growth elsewhere, particularly in the HTTP
protocol.60 The resurgence of HTTP has several causes: The increased
popularity of streaming media and video-on-demand sites (e.g.,
YouTube, Hulu, and Netflix); the explosion of social networking sites
(e.g., Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter); and the migration of users to
online file-hosting services, known as cyberlockers or Direct Download
Links (DDLs) (e.g., Megaupload and RapidShare).61 A 2010 forecast
by Cisco Systems predicts that although P2P traffic will continue to
grow in volume at an annual rate of 16 percent through 2014, it will
58. See, e.g., Carothers et al., supra note 29, at 1 (reporting the creation of a highly
scalable simulation model that requires 30 to 1000 times less memory per peer than operational
BitTorrent software); Lu Liu et al., Efficient and Scalable Search on Scale-Free P2P Networks, 2
PEER-TO-PEER NETW. APPL. 98, 98 (2009) (reporting on the development of a P2P search protocol
that improves on existing models by considering both the number of shared files and the
connectivity of each neighboring node in the network); Xia & Muppala, supra note 30, at 151
(summarizing the results of studies in which researchers have sought to optimize peer selection
in a variety of ways).
59. P4P is an initiative of the Distributed Computing Industry Association (DCIA) and
counts among its members broadband providers, including Verizon, Comcast, and AT&T, and
P2P software distributors, including BitTorrent. See P4P Working Group (P4PWG) Membership,
DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING INDUSTRY ASS'N, http://www.dcia.info/activities/p4pwg/membership.
html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). "P4P stands for proactive network provider participation for
P2P, or provider portal for P2P. The objectives of P4P are to (1) facilitate network applications,
in particular P2P applications, to achieve the best possible application performance under
efficient and fair usage of network resources; and (2) allow network providers to achieve efficient
and fair usage of their resources to satisfy application requirements, reduce cost, and increase
revenue." HAIYONG XIE ET AL., P4P: EXPLICIT COMMUNICATIONS FOR COOPERATIVE CONTROL
BETWEEN P2P AND NETWORK PROVIDERS 2 (2007), available at http://www.dcia.info/documents/
P4POverview.pdf.
60. See SCHULZE & MOCHALSKI, supra note 53, at 2-3; Maier et al., supra note 56, at 90.
61. See SCHULZE & MOCHALSKI, supra note 53, at 11-12; Maier et al., supra note 56, at
96.
704 [Vol. 13:4:695
2011] SCALABILITY OF ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT
drop over the same period to only 17 percent of total consumer
Internet traffic. 62 Traffic on file-hosting services, by comparison, is
expected to grow about three times faster.63 In a recent filing with the
FCC, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) described the
proliferation of file-hosting sites as a manifestation of increasing
fragmentation in the online market for infringing content.64 The
International Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) made a
similar observation about fragmentation in its 2010 Digital Music
Report, citing a U.K. study which found that although P2P remains
the major platform for online piracy, illegal distribution through other
channels, including Usenet groups and cyberlockers, grew
significantly in 2009.65
Cyberlocker sites rely on a centralized architecture and thus
seem to represent a step backwards in the evolution toward
completely distributed networks. 66 This recentralization makes life
easier for copyright owners, because centralized content distribution
systems, unlike distributed ones, provide static and easily identifiable
targets for litigation and other enforcement efforts. 67 When a system
is as large, dynamic, and decentralized as a P2P network, trying to
shut it down by targeting individual nodes is a losing proposition. 68
Some nodes will be more connected than others, and destruction of
these highly connected nodes will be relatively more damaging to the
network as a whole, but a very large distributed network will survive
62. CISCO SYS., INC., Cisco VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY
2009-2014, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter CISCO FORECAST 2009-2014]. At the end of 2009, P2P traffic
accounted for 39% of total consumer Internet traffic. Id. At the end of 2008, it accounted for 50%.
CISCO SYS., INC., CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY 2008-2013,
at 2 (2009).
63. Cisco FORECAST 2009-2014, supra note 62, at 2 (projecting an annual growth rate
of 47% in file sharing).
64. MOTION PICTURE AsS'N OF AM., INC., REPLY COMMENTS IN THE MATTER OF
PRESERVING THE OPEN INTERNET AND BROADBAND INDUSTRY PRACTICES 13-14 & n.32 (Apr. 26,
2010), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Resources/46ba617a-4dc9-4fdb-acce-9100ac274af4.pdf.
65. INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 6 (2010),
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2010.pdf.
66. See J.A. Pouwelse et al., Pirates and Samaritans: A Decade of Measurements on Peer
Production and Their Implications for Net Neutrality and Copyright, 32 TELECOMM. POL'Y 701,
706 (2008) (characterizing the development of post-P2P content-sharing systems that rely on
centralized architecture-for example, YouTube-as an evolutionary step backwards).
67. As Jonathan Zittrain has pointed out, "[t]hose seeking to block the illegal content
must pressure the entity within the chain of data transfer whose selection maximizes the
chances of both legal responsibility and successful enforcement." Jonathan Zittrain, Internet
Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 658 (2003). This process becomes relatively easy when all
of the illegal content resides in one place under the control of one entity.
68. See Andrds Guadamuz Gonzdlez, Scale-Free Law: Network Science and Copyright,
70 ALB. L. REV. 1297, 1316 (2007) (explaining that scale-free networks, including P2P networks,
are robust and stable, in part because most of the nodes are not hubs, so an attack on any one
node is unlikely to have any impact on the network as a whole).
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the targeting of individual nodes, and its connections will simply
reroute around the failure. 69  A defining feature of distributed
networks, including the Internet itself and the P2P networks that
overlay it, is their resiliency in the face of failure or attack.70 This
resiliency is one key to their scalability.
II. THE SCALE OF P2P INFRINGEMENT AND ITS HARMS
A. "Massive Infringement" as a Rhetorical Construct
The use of adjectives denoting great scale (e.g., terms like
"vast" and "massive") to describe the problem of P2P piracy has long
been a rhetorical strategy of the copyright industries, which have
thereby sought to impress upon legislatures and courts both the
magnitude of the problem they face and the need for urgent and
decisive action.71 Although not particularly subtle, the strategy has
been quite effective, judging from the number of court decisions that
incorporate the industry's scale-conscious rhetoric. The cases against
P2P software distributors going back to A&M Records v. Napster are
strewn with references to the "massive" scale of P2P infringement. 72
69. See id. at 1316-18 (suggesting that targeting of supernodes or hubs might be more
successful than random attacks).
70. See id. at 1316.
71. The IFPI's annual digital music reports provide a nice longitudinal sample of how
this strategy has been deployed. See INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 65, at
5 (referring to "the vast number of people who currently do not pay for music they consume");
INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS, IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 22 (2009) [hereinafter
2009 DIGITAL Music REPORT], available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2009.pdf
(arguing that "the vast scale of unauthorised music consumption is massively damaging
investment in music and the careers of artists"); INVL FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS, IFPI,
DIGITAL Music REPORT 21 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT], available at
http://ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2008.pdf (asserting the need for "a system for curbing mass
copyright infringement"); id. at 22 (describing the "vast bulk" of P2P traffic as infringing); id. at
8 (lamenting "massive unauthorised distribution"); INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS,
IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 18 (2007), available at http://ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2007.pdf
(stating that "Limewire and BitTorrent continued to be massive carriers of copyright theft" in
2006); id. at 12 (warning that social networking sites should not use innovation "as an excuse . . .
to practice massive copyright infringement"); INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS, IFPI,
DIGITAL MusIc REPORT 18 (2006), available at http://ifpi.org/content/library/digital-music-report-
2006.pdf (warning that "P2P services cannot simply turn a blind eye ... and profit from massive
infringement"); INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS, IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 18
(2005), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/digital-music-report-2005.pdf (describing
P2P file sharers as "large-scale distributors of unauthorized files"); INT'L FED'N OF THE
PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS, IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 8 (2004), available at http://ifpi.org/
content/library/digital-music-report-2004.pdf (stating that the "vast bulk" of music consumed
online is unlicensed).
72. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, No. 06-cv-5936, 2010 WL
2291485, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) (holding that "[tihe massive scale of infringement
committed by LimeWire users, and LW's knowledge of that infringement, supports a finding that
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In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Justice Souter wrote of the
"gigantic scale" and "staggering" scope of the alleged infringement. 73
Similar language permeates the cases against individual file-sharers.
In Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Bryant, for example, the court
wrote that "the process [of P2P file sharing] is potentially exponential
rather than linear, threatening virtually unstoppable infringement of
the copyright."74 In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, the
court described P2P technology as leaving the plaintiffs' works
"vulnerable to massive, repeated, and worldwide infringement."75
When it comes to online infringement, the industry's clarion message
has been that scale changes everything: If the problem were smaller
and more localized-if the potential losses were not so easily
multiplied-the situation would be much less dire for industry
plaintiffs, and the need for immediate relief less acute.
The copyright industries have targeted Congress, as well as the
courts, with the message that size matters. Transcripts of legislative
hearings on file sharing are full of scale-conscious language. In this
context, members of the House Judiciary Committee have
characterized file sharing as an "epidemic," 76 citing dramatic statistics
to prove its "devastating impact" on the entertainment industry.7 In
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee supporting passage
of the Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringements Act of 2004,
Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters accused P2P software
distributors of using P2P technology to "create vast global networks of
LW intended to induce infringement"); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d
1197, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (referring to "undisputed evidence at summary judgment of massive
end-user infringement"); id. at 1224 (referring to a prior holding that "StreamCast's business
model depended upon massive infringement"); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d
634, 638 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (describing the Aimster service as one "whose very raison d'[6]tre
appears to be the facilitation of and contribution to copyright infringement on a massive scale");
id. at 649 (referring to "the ongoing, massive, and unauthorized distribution and copying of
Plaintiffs' copyrighted works"); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (referring to "the massive downloading of MP3 files by Napster users"); id. at
925 (finding that "the evidence establishes that unauthorized sharing of plaintiffs' copyrighted
music occurred on a massive scale"); id. at 926 (citing "statistical evidence of massive,
unauthorized downloading and uploading of plaintiffs' copyrighted works").
73. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005) (finding that MGM
presented "evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale"); id. at 923 (concluding that "the
probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering").
74. No. CV 03-6381, 2004 WL 783123, at *7 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 2004).
75. 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073 (D. Ariz. 2006).
76. Reducing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Piracy on University Campuses: A Progress Update:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 79 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing].
77. Id. at 12-65. Rep. Howard Berman (CA) opened the hearing with the following
statistics: "In March 2005 alone, 243 million songs were downloaded from illicit peer-to-peer
services. It's estimated that approximately 400,000 films are illegally downloaded every day." Id.
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copyright infringement."7 8 Testifying a few years later before the
House Judiciary Committee, Cary Sherman of the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) described file sharing on university
campuses as a "massive assault."7 9 Summing up his industry's losses,
Sherman alleged harms at once calculably and incalculably great:
"billions of dollars in lost sales, thousands of lost jobs, countless lost
career opportunities."80 This official message of titanic loss has been
so consistent over time, and delivered so often to so many audiences,
that it is now taken for granted from hearing rooms to court rooms to
news rooms. There is garden variety infringement, the industries'
logic goes, but then there is "massive infringement," for which the
Internet is to blame and which differs so much in degree from what
came before that it begs to be treated as different in kind.
B. The Challenge of Measuring Massive Infringement
As with estimates of P2P traffic as a proportion of total
Internet traffic, estimates of infringing traffic as a proportion of total
P2P traffic have varied over time and among sources. In the
literature on P2P, much of it authored by trade groups representing
corporate rights owners, a commonplace claim is that piracy accounts
largely, if not overwhelmingly, for the traffic on P2P networks.81 P2P
plaintiffs have repeatedly made this claim, and courts have generally
found it to be vindicated by credible evidence, including expert
testimony. MGM's expert statistician in Grokster found that nearly 90
percent of the files available on the FastTrack system were
copyrighted, and the Court was persuaded that the "vast majority" of
downloads were, in fact, infringing.82 More recently, the court in
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC credited Arista's expert's
testimony that 98.8 percent of the files requested for download on the
LimeWire system were copyrighted and not authorized for free
78. Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of the Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights).
79. An Update: Piracy on University Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 9 (2007)
[hereinafter Hearing 11] (testimony of Cary Sherman, President, RIAA).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., DANIEL CASTRO ET AL., STEAL THESE POLICIES: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING
DIGITAL PIRACY 2 (2009) available at http://www.itif.org/files/2009-digital-piracy.pdf (asserting
that unauthorized distribution of copyrighted content has become "the principal use of [P2P]
technology, although such networks are occasionally used to distribute legal content"); 2009
DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 65, at 22 (claiming that "file-swapping of copyrighted music
and movies is widely acknowledged to account for a large part of P2P activity").
82. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922-23 (2005).
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distribution.83  In Columbia Pictures v. Fung, a case involving
secondary infringement claims against the operators of the isoHunt
and TorrentBox torrent tracker sites, Columbia's expert testified that
over 90 percent of the downloads available through the sites were
copyright protected.84 In a decision granting Columbia's motion for
summary judgment, the court found that the defendant, Fung, had
failed to call the opposing expert's conclusions into doubt or to rebut
the expert's statement that he relied on standard statistical sampling
techniques to arrive at the numbers in his report.85 Even if the
percentages were not actually as high as the expert reported, the court
said, there was no question that a substantial percentage of the
available files were infringing-enough to prove the plaintiffs
claims.86
Outside the context of expert testimony and industry white
papers, data on the percentage of P2P traffic that is copyright
infringing are difficult to locate, but the available data tend to
corroborate industry assertions that the bulk of files available on P2P
networks are infringing.87 Australian researchers from the University
of Ballarat reported in 2010 that 89 percent of all torrents-97.9
percent of all non-pornographic torrents-in a sample of over one
million were infringing.88 Of the torrents in the top three categories
by volume-movies, TV shows, and music-there were no legal
torrents in the study's sample. 89 To highlight the difficulty of finding
truly independent statistics, it is worth noting that the study, though
released under the auspices of the Internet Commerce Security
Laboratory, was supported by a major Australian movie and DVD
distributor. 90 In a smaller study, apparently without industry ties, a
student researcher at Princeton University found that all of the movie,
TV, and music torrents in a sample consisting of 1021 files were likely
83. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, No. 06-cv-5936, 2010 WL 2291485, at *51
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010).
84. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, No. CVO6-5578, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122661,
at *17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).
85. Id.
86. Id. at *18-19.
87. See, e.g., 2008 DIGITAL Music REPORT, supra note 71, at 22 ("Independent estimates
suggest up to 80 per cent of internet traffic is generated by P2P file distribution, the vast bulk of
which is unauthorised [sic] use of copyrighted music and movies.").
88. See ROBERT LAYTON & PAUL WATTERS, INVESTIGATION INTO THE EXTENT OF
INFRINGING CONTENT ON BITTORRENT NETWORKS 1, 21 (2010), available at http://www.afact.
org.au/research/bt -report final.pdf.
89. Id. at 1.
90. The study was funded by Village Roadshow. Id. It is prominently featured on the
home page of AFACT-the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft. See AUSTRALIAN
FED'N AGAINST COPYRIGHT THEFT, http://www.afact.org.au (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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infringing.91 Only 1 percent of the files in the sample, which also
included video games, software, books, and pornography, were
classified as likely non-infringing.92
C. The Challenge of Measuring Massive Infringement's Harms
Reliable and independent numbers are even more elusive when
it comes to measuring file sharing's economic impact on the copyright
industries and the U.S. economy as a whole. The claims made by
industry representatives are, not surprisingly, quite dramatic. In
comments to the FCC in 2010, the MPAA asserted that online
infringement costs U.S. creative industries billions of dollars and
hundreds of thousands of jobs annually. 93 A 2007 study often cited by
industry trade groups estimated annual losses on the same order of
magnitude: $58 billion in total output, over 370,000 jobs, and $2.6
billion in tax revenue. 94
These estimates, the methodologies that produced them, and
the assumptions on which they rely have been challenged on their
merits95 and countered by at least one major study whose authors
attempted to look at the other side of the coin, assessing the value
added to the economy by industries that rely on fair uses of
copyrighted works. 96 As required by the Prioritizing Resources and
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act), the
General Accounting Office (GAO) examined existing research on the
economic effects of counterfeiting and piracy.97 In a report released in
91. See Ed Felten, Census of Files Available via BitTorrent, FREEDOM TO TINKER, (Jan.
29, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/census-files-available-
bittorrent (summarizing the results of the study by Princeton senior Sauhard Sahi).
92. Id.
93. MOTION PICTURE AsS'N OF AM., INC., supra note 64, at 5-6.
94. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF
COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (2007), Siwek's data is from 2005. Id.
95. See COMPUTER & COMMC'NS INDUS. ASS'N, COMMENTS ON THE JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN 6-36 (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/
Filename/000000000334/NC-CCIAIPECComments.pdf (arguing that industry estimates of
piracy losses reflect nine different fallacies).
96. See THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 9
(2010), available at http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000354/
fair-use-study-final.pdf ("The fair use economy in 2007 accounted for $4.7 trillion in revenues
and $2.2 trillion in value added, roughly one-sixth of total U.S. GDP. It employed more than 17
million people and supported a payroll of $1.2 trillion. Fair use companies generated $281 billion
in exports and rapid productivity growth.").
97. See Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008,
Publ. L. No. 110-403, § 501, 122 Stat. 4256 (directing the GAO to "conduct a study to help
determine how the Federal Government could better protect the intellectual property of
manufacturers by quantification of the impacts of imported and domestic counterfeit goods on ...
the overall economy of the United States.").
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2010, the GAO concluded that economic loss estimates widely cited by
the government could not be substantiated due to the absence of
underlying studies.98 In attempting to discover the origin of the
estimates, the GAO learned from government officials that the
numbers came directly from industry;99 they were neither
independently reviewed nor supported by any disclosure of data or
methodology.100 To all appearances, corporate rights owners have
been laundering their loss statistics to win support for their legislative
and enforcement agendas: They submit estimates to government
officials, who uncritically quote the estimates in government
documents, which industry representatives then quote to the media as
official proof of the losses piracy causes.10' By means of this circuit,
numbers based on questionable assumptions and emanating from
sources with a vested interest in their inflation acquire a false air of
objectivity and empirical soundness. Because policy and enforcement
apparatuses informed by skewed statistics are bound to produce
skewed priorities and initiatives, the GAO report should stand as a
reminder to policy makers of the need for disinterested data gathering
and assessment.
There is, however, some truth behind the hype.
Notwithstanding the copyright industries' propensity to exaggerate
their losses, or the fastness and looseness with which their statistics
are (re)circulated by uncritical government officials and media outlets,
there can be little question that P2P networks have facilitated large-
scale infringement, or that the volume of files traded illegally by
means of such networks has been, and remains, large and revenue-
depleting. As the GAO concluded, without factitious precision, "the
problem is sizeable."102
98. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON
EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 18 (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10423.pdf.
99. Id. at 16 ("Commerce and FBI officials told us they rely on industry statistics on
counterfeit and pirated goods and do not conduct any original data gathering to assess the
economic impact of counterfeit and pirated goods on the U.S. economy or domestic industries.").
100. Id. (explaining that "industry associations do not always disclose their proprietary
data sources and methods, making it difficult to verify their estimates.").
101. Id. at 18 (explaining how the process worked with respect to a 2002 FBI press
release).
102. Id. at 15.
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III. THE DMCA AND THE SCALABILITY OF ONLINE ENFORCEMENT
A. "Scaling Up" Enforcement to Facilitate Growth
The legislative history of the DMCA frames the statute as a
means of ensuring the continued global growth of the Internet. 103 To
facilitate that goal, the statute was crafted to minimize obstacles to
growth for both content providers, who would not expand the digital
distribution of their works without assurances that they would be
protected from "massive piracy," and service providers, 104 who would
not expand their sites and networks without assurances that they
would be protected from massive liability for copyright
infringement.10 5 In light of the legislative history's focus on promoting
Internet growth, the DMCA can be understood as a mechanism for
simultaneously scaling up online copyright enforcement and scaling
back online copyright liability-a unified solution designed to give
rights owners the security necessary to expand content distribution
and service providers the security necessary to expand applications
and network infrastructure.
The DMCA scales up enforcement while scaling back liability
through provisions in Title I that prohibit circumvention of
technological protection measures 06 and provisions in Title II that
create safe harbors for service providers, conditioned on their assisting
rights owners in the expeditious resolution of online copyright
infringement disputes. 107 There are two provisions from Title II on
which copyright owners have relied heavily in their efforts to make
enforcement scale for the digital environment: § 512(c), which
establishes the notice-and-takedown framework for which the DMCA
is most well-known,108 and § 512(h), which allows rights owners to
103. See S. REP. No.105-190, at 1-2 (1998) ("The 'Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998' is designed to facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic
commerce, communications, research, development, and education in the digital age.").
104. In the statute, the term "service provider" is defined broadly to include both
providers of Internet access (ISPs) and providers of online services. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (2006).
105. See S. REP. No.105-190, at 8 ("Due to the ease with which digital works can be
copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to
make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will
be protected against massive piracy. . . . At the same time, without clarification of their liability,
service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the speed
and capacity of the Internet.").
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d). As Edward Lee has noted, Title I expands copyright
liability, while Title II contracts it. Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 233, 233 (2009).
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); see also Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process
or "Chilling Effects'? Takedown Notices under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
[Vol. 13:4:695712
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serve subpoenas on service providers outside of litigation to obtain the
identities of alleged infringers.109 Tacitly premised on the reality that
litigation is not an efficient means of resolving the voluminous
infringement claims that arise in the context of online services, §
512(c) and § 512(h) require service providers to act cooperatively with
rights owners, without intervention from a court, to remove allegedly
infringing content from their services and to identify those ostensibly
responsible for its distribution.
B. The DMCA's Scalability for Hosted Content
Notwithstanding initial resistance from both camps, service
providers and rights owners have adapted quite well over the last
decade to doing business within the parameters defined by the
DMCA's notice-and-takedown system.110 On YouTube, for example,
the § 512(c) notice process is fully automated for both individual and
corporate rights owners.111 Facebook also offers a standardized online
notice form, 112 and Scribd provides DMCA-compliant templates for
both notices and counter-notices.113 On these popular content-sharing
sites, the notice-and-takedown system has come to operate as a well-
oiled, always-on copyright enforcement machine.
Notwithstanding this fact, corporate rights owners have argued
since the DMCA's enactment, and more loudly since the dawn of Web
2.0 and the user-generated content (UGC) revolution, that the notice-
and-takedown machinery in the DMCA is inadequate to protect their
Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 624-31 (2006) (giving a detailed
explanation of the mechanics of notice and takedown under the DMCA).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) ("A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the
owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a
service provider for identification of an alleged infringer .... The request may be made by filing
with the clerk . . . a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A); a proposed subpoena;
and a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to
obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used for the
purpose of protecting rights under this title.").
110. See Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse
Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted
Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 994 (2007) (concluding that "the past decade of experience
with the DMCA notice and takedown regime suggests that a relatively balanced and workable
solution to this particular dual-use technology problem has been found.").
111. See Content Management, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/dmca-policy (last
visited Oct. 5, 2010).
112. See DMCA Notice of Copyright Infringement, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
legal/copyright.php?copyright notice=l (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
113. See DMCA Copyright Infringement Takedown Notification Template, SCRIBD
http://support.scribd.com/forums/33563/entries/22980 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010); DMCA
Counter-Notification Template, SCRIBD, http://support.scribd.com/forums/33563/entries/22993
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
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rights.114 Viacom has pressed this argument, so far unsuccessfully, in
its closely watched lawsuit against YouTube.115  In an opinion
granting YouTube's motion for summary judgment based on the
company's consistent compliance with the terms of the DMCA's safe
harbor provisions, the court rejected Viacom's contention that the
notice-and-takedown system is an enforcement failure. 16 On the
contrary, the court concluded, evidence in the record suggested that
the system is both functional and efficient: "Indeed, the present case
shows that the DMCA notification regime works efficiently: When
Viacom over a period of months accumulated some 100,000 videos and
then sent one mass take-down notice on February 2, 2007, by the next
business day YouTube had removed virtually all of them."117
Viacom's power to eliminate 100,000 instances of alleged
infringement overnight, with a single notice, is a testament to the
DMCA's success in making online enforcement scalable without
creating growth-inhibiting burdens for online services like YouTube,
whose business models are founded on content sharing. Although
copyright owners continue to advocate a judicial interpretation of the
DMCA that would require sites like YouTube to be more proactive in
their efforts to enforce third-party copyrights, the DMCA is quite clear
that active monitoring for infringing content is not a burden that
114. See, e.g., Anthony Bruno, RIAA to Google: Help Us Fight Piracy, BILLBOARD.BIZ,
Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content displayindustrye3if6a7faa5026473498
f596f5a73238fa5 (reproducing the text of a letter from the RIAA and other industry groups to
Google CEO Eric Schmidt, in which the senders state that "[t]he current legal and regulatory
regime is not working for America's creators"); Declan McCullagh, RIAA- U.S. Copyright Law
'Isn't Working,' CNET NEws (Aug. 23, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20014468-
38.html (quoting RIAA president Cary Sherman).
115. Viacom Int'l. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(granting summary judgment to YouTube). In its complaint, Viacom accused Google of "shift[ing]
the burden entirely onto copyright owners to monitor the YouTube site on a daily or hourly basis
to detect infringing videos and send notices to YouTube demanding that it 'take down' the
infringing works." Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 1 6, Viacom,
718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (No. 1:07CV02103). In reality, the law puts that burden squarely on rights
owners like Viacom; the DMCA expressly does not condition eligibility for safe harbor on a
service provider's monitoring its service for infringing content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2006)
("Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a)
through (d) on a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating
infringing activity . . . ."). Viacom thus asked the court to hold YouTube liable for a sin of
omission that the law does not recognize as a sin at all. See Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages, supra. It is interesting to note that Viacom's complaint is full of
the scale-conscious rhetoric discussed in Part II above. For example, Viacom alleged that
"YouTube has harnessed technology to willfully infringe copyrights on a huge scale," id. 1 2, that
"YouTube appropriates the value of creative content on a massive scale," id. 1 2, that "a vast
amount" of the content available on YouTube is infringing," id. 1 3, and that YouTube has "done
little or nothing to prevent this massive infringement," id. 5.
116. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
117. Id.
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Congress saw fit to allocate to service providers when it balanced the
need to make the Internet safe for copyright owners against the need
to promote growth and innovation in online services.118
C. The Costs of Scalable Enforcement
There are, of course, downsides to a system designed to avoid
the delay and expense of litigation by facilitating the overnight
removal of 100,000 allegedly infringing files. Along with such
efficiency comes the potential for abuse by copyright owners. For
example, notices of infringement have been used to censor speech that
copyright owners find offensive and to suppress unlicensed uses of
copyrighted works that are colorably fair;119 similarly, DMCA pre-
litigation subpoenas have been used as a pretext for identifying
constitutionally protected anonymous speakers. 120 While the DMCA
does contain provisions designed to protect users from notices sent in
bad faith 121 and to enable the restoration of wrongfully removed
material, 122 it is unclear whether these safeguards are as protective of
users' rights in practice as they are in theory. 123 Forced to choose
between protecting themselves from liability and protecting the
118. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Although it is not required to do so by
the DMCA, YouTube maintains an automated audio and video identification system by means of
which infringing content can be blocked, tracked, or monetized, as the copyright owner prefers.
See Audio ID and Video ID, YoUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
119. See Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 367-68
(2003) (arguing that "piracy surveillance techniques ... fail to consider two significant costs to
non-offenders: overdeterrence of speech and evisceration of fair use."); Seth K. Kreimer,
Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the
Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 32-33 (2006) (giving examples of speech-censoring abuses of
the DMCA); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1888-89 (2000)
(discussing the troubling First Amendment implications of the DMCA's notice-and-takedown
framework); Jacqui Cheng, Five Examples of Lame DMCA Takedowns, ARS TECHNICA (May 16,
2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/05/five-examples-of-lame-dmca-takedowns.
ars.
120. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Issued Pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
to: 43SB.Com, LLC, 86 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1505 (D. Idaho 2007) (quashing a § 512(h) subpoena
intended to identify a pseudonymous blog commenter based on the blog operator's posting of a
copyrighted cease and desist letter, which alleged that the commenter's statements were
defamatory).
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (providing for remedies in cases of knowing material
misrepresentation that material is infringing).
122. See id. § 512(g) (providing for the replacement of removed material).
123. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1003 (2008) (pointing out that most users who receive
notices of infringement do not attempt to have removed material restored); Urban & Quilter,
supra note 108, at 636 (questioning whether the procedural protections in § 512 are sufficient to
provide adequate recourse for users).
715
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
expressive rights of their users, service providers are much more
likely to err on the side of caution. 1 2 4  In this regard, the DMCA's
mechanisms for streamlining dispute resolution are not without costs.
Rights owners like Viacom focus exclusively on the costs of under-
enforcement, but over-enforcement is an equally problematic artifact
of § 512's workable-though-imperfect design for making online
copyright enforcement scalable for hosted content.
D. The DMCA's Failure to Scale for P2P
It is not the end of the story, however, to say that the DMCA's
enforcement machinery has proven to be scalable with respect to
service providers that host content for users. The DMCA has not
scaled well for enforcing copyrights infringed by means of P2P file-
sharing networks, because the statute was designed primarily to
address infringements that occur when users upload copyrighted
material to a provider's servers or link to infringing content posted by
others. 125 When it enacted the DMCA, Congress did not anticipate the
distributed nature of P2P networks or the correspondingly distributed
nature of the infringement they would enable. High-volume
infringement is relatively easy to detect and combat when the content
in question is fixed on the servers of easily identifiable intermediaries
with duly designated DMCA agents; 126 it becomes much harder to
detect and combat when that content is in transit across a distributed
network whose membership is anonymous and dynamic.
The safe harbor provisions of § 512 cover four types of service
provider functions: transitory digital network communications (i.e.,
routing and transmission), system caching, storage on behalf of users,
124. This tendency is encouraged by the DMCA's absolution of ISPs for good faith
removal of material that is ultimately found to be non-infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). As
Seth Kreimer has explained, "if it is costly to distinguish protected from unprotected speech, the
proxy censor is likely to abandon the effort to avoid errors and adopt a conscious policy of
prophylactic self-censorship that blocks any content that could precipitate the threat of
sanctions." Kreimer, supra note 119, at 28. See also Mark Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe
Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115 (2007) ("Notice and takedown therefore
rewards overzealous copyright owners who use the DMCA mechanism to rid the Web even of
legitimate content, secure in the expectation that ISPs will take everything down rather than
risk their eligibility for the safe harbor.").
125. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service
Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 41 (2006) ("[The DMCA]
was designed to address a mainly centralized architecture . . . . Peer-to-peer architecture, by
contrast, is decentralized and allows users to search for files stored in the libraries of other
users.").
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (requiring designation of an agent to receive notifications
of claimed infringement).
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and information location. 12 7  Service providers performing each of
these functions, with the significant exception of routing and
transmission, are required to comply with the notice-and-takedown
framework in § 512(c). 128 The DMCA's primary focus on user-
uploaded material residing on the systems of service providers reflects
the then-current state of the art in network architecture. 129 Before
P2P file-sharing applications came onto the scene, the most copyright-
relevant function an online service provider performed was storage on
behalf of users-the function covered by the safe harbor in § 512(c). 1 30
In P2P networks, however, files are not uploaded to a provider's
server; they remain instead on the users' own systems, from which
other users directly retrieve them. 131 In this architecture, the most
copyright-relevant functions a service provider performs are routing
and transmission-the functions covered by the safe harbor in §
512(a). 132 Because the DMCA was designed to deal with providers
serving a centralized file-storage function, it has proven a poor fit in
cases involving P2P, where the service provider functions only as a
pass-through or conduit for the transfer of infringing material. 133
The DMCA's exemption of providers of routing and
transmission services (a.k.a. "mere conduits") from the notice-and-
takedown requirements in § 512(c) is entirely consistent with the fact
that such providers do not store or control user content.134
Nevertheless, the exemption has operated in the context of P2P file
sharing to negate the scalable enforcement mechanism that notice and
takedown provides. Inasmuch as P2P file sharing shifts the locus of
infringing activity from the storage function to the transmission
function, it places such activity beyond the knowledge and control of
127. See id. § 512(a)-(d).
128. For providers of system caching, the requirement is found at § 512(b)(2)(E). For
providers of storage on behalf of users, the requirement is found at § 512(c)(1)(C). For providers
of information location tools, the requirement is found at § 512(d)(3). There is no corresponding
requirement for providers of routing and transmission services.
129. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 125, at 41.
130. Bridy, Response, supra note 51, at 97.
131. Id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining how a P2P system works)).
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also Lemley, supra note 124, at 113 (remarking on the obsolescence of the
DMCA's safe harbors in light of P2P technology).
134. See Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 776
(8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the absence of the notification and remove-or-disable-access
provisions from § 512(a) "makes sense where an ISP merely acts as a conduit for infringing
material . .. because the ISP has no ability to remove the infringing material from its system or
disable access to the infringing material").
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the ISP and thus beyond the reach of the enforcement scheme created
by § 512(c).135
As a consequence of the exemption of conduit providers from
the notice and takedown requirements of § 512(c), the expedited
subpoena provision in the DMCA-§ 512(h)-has also been held
inapplicable to these providers. 136 This is because the application for a
subpoena under § 512(h) must include a copy of the notice described in
§ 512(c)(3)(A).13 7 The notice described in § 512(c)(3)(A) must identify,
among other things, "the material that is claimed to be infringing ...
and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled" by the
service provider. 138 In reaching the conclusion that the subpoena
power in § 512(h) cannot be held to extend to providers covered by §
512(a), the Courts of Appeals for the D.C. and Eighth Circuits found it
dispositive that § 512(c)'s notice-and-takedown requirements do not
apply on the face of the statute to providers that act simply as
conduits for information.139 After all, how can § 512(h), which
expressly requires an applicant to submit a copy of a notice compliant
with § 512(c), apply to providers that are not subject to § 512(c) in the
first place? 140 It makes more sense to conclude, as these Circuits did,
that the references to § 512(c) in § 512(h) restrict the applicability of §
512(h) to providers that are able to remove or disable access to specific
material. 141  In short, courts have held, there is an assumption
135. Although in-network filtering and blocking technologies have greatly evolved since
the passage of the DMCA, and broadband providers actively manage network traffic in ways that
were not then possible, the statute presupposes a passive transit model; § 512(a) requires that
material be transmitted through the qualifying provider's system "through an automatic
technical process and without selection of the material by the service provider." 17 U.S.C. §
512(a)(2) (2006).
136. See Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 777; Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
139. See Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 776 (explaining that each safe harbor that
covers a function allowing the ISP to remove or disable access to infringing material (i.e.,
storage, system caching, or linking) contains a remove-or-disable access provision); Verizon
Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236-37 ("We agree that the presence in § 512(h) of three
separate references to § 512(c) and the absence of any reference to § 512(a) suggests the
subpoena power of § 512(h) applies only to ISPs engaged in storing copyrighted material and not
to those engaged solely in transmitting it on behalf of others.").
140. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236-37. I have argued elsewhere that
judicial interpretations of § 512(i)-the DMCA's repeat infringer provision, which applies to all
types of providers seeking safe harbor under § 512-have potentially created a "back door"
requirement for conduit providers to have in place a system for receiving and responding to
notices of infringement sent by rights owners. See Bridy, Response, supra note 51, at 98.
141. See Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771; Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229.
But see Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Copyright
Protection Over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 627, 673 (2009).
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underlying § 512(h) that a subpoena recipient will actually be in a
position to take down material identified as infringing.
It is possible, perhaps even probable, that § 512(h) would have
been written differently if P2P technology had existed at the time of
the DMCA's drafting. 142 In light of that possibility, rights owners
have persuaded some judges that the subpoena provision should be
held to apply to service providers covered by §512(a), despite the
assumption underlying § 512(h) that subpoena recipients can remove
or disable access to specific material. 143 In the face of unanticipated
technological developments, these judges look past the letter of the
DMCA to make it scale for P2P file sharing. Such recuperative acts
are plainly beyond the judiciary's competence, however, as the D.C.
Circuit said in Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Services:
It is not the province of the courts ... to rewrite the DMCA in order to make it fit a new
and unfor[e]seen [I]nternet architecture, no matter how damaging that development has
been to the music industry or threatens being to the motion picture and software
industries. The plight of copyright holders must be addressed in the first instance by
the Congress .... 144
In the absence of Congressional action to bring P2P file sharing and
the providers whose networks are used for it within the scope of §§
512(c) and (h) of the DMCA, rights owners cannot avail themselves of
the statute's mechanisms for making online copyright enforcement
scalable by allowing it to operate outside of litigation. When it comes
to P2P file sharers, rights owners must sue to enforce their copyrights
and, for that matter, even to figure out whom to sue.
E. A Perverse Consequence of the DMCA's Failure to Scale for P2P
In her dissent in Charter Communications, the Eighth Circuit
case that interpreted § 512(h) to exclude § 512(a) providers, Judge
Murphy emphasized the negative implications of the majority's
holding for the DMCA's goal of making online copyright enforcement
scalable:
142. See Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d at 1238 ("Had the Congress been aware of P2P
technology, or anticipated its development, § 512(h) might have been drafted more generally.").
143. See Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 778 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (asserting that
§ 512(h) should apply to conduit providers); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that § 512(h) applies to conduit providers
seeking safe harbor under § 512(a)), rev'd, 351 F.3d 1229.
144. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d at 1238; see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (M.D.N.C. 2005) ("While the RIAA's
argument at first blush is tempting, the Court rejects it because it would necessarily amount to
the rewriting of the statute.").
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The majority's interpretation of the statute . . . denies copyright holders the ability to
obtain identification of those subscribers who purloin protected materials through §
512(a) conduit ISPs ... . The suggestion that copyright holders should be left to file
John Doe lawsuits to protect themselves from infringement by subscribers of conduit
ISPs like Charter, instead of availing themselves of the mechanism Congress provided
in the DMCA, is impractical and contrary to legislative intent. John Doe actions are
costly and time consuming. Nowhere in the DMCA did Congress indicate that copyright
holders should be relegated to such cumbersome and expensive measures against
conduit ISPs. 14 5
While Judge Murphy's observations concerning the practical
consequences of a narrow interpretation of § 512(h) are unarguable,
her colleagues rightly declined to "contort the statute" to make it
applicable in P2P cases. 146
Unable to use the DMCA's expedited subpoena provision to
uncover the identities of alleged P2P infringers, rights owners
predictably fell back on filing John Doe lawsuits and seeking
expedited discovery under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to identify accused file sharers. 147  To counteract the
massive scale of P2P infringement, the RIAA vowed to fight fire with
fire, suing massive numbers of file sharers beginning in 2003.148 In an
effort to make the litigation scalable, it named hundreds of John Doe
defendants per filing in a coordinated legal campaign similar to mass
tort litigation, but with the aggregation occurring on the defendant's
side-a rarity in the world of aggregate proceedings.149
145. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d at 782 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 777 (majority opinion) ("We agree with and adopt the reasoning of the
[court] in Verizon as it pertains to this statutory issue.... As a court we are bound to interpret
the terms of the statute and not to contort the statute to cover the situation presented by this
case.").
147. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does, 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 305 (N.D.
Cal. 2006) (granting the plaintiff copyright owner's motion to serve immediate discovery on an
ISP in the form of a Rule 45 subpoena seeking each John Doe defendant's true name, address,
telephone number, e-mail address, and Media Access Control (MAC) address).
148. See Liane Cassavoy, Music Labels Declare War on File Swappers, PC WORLD, Sept.
8, 2003, http://www.pcworld.com/article/1 12364/music labels-declare war on_file swappers.
html ("The Recording Industry Association of America has filed lawsuits against 261 people ....
These lawsuits are just the first of subsequent waves of litigation, [RIAA President Cary]
Sherman says, noting the RIAA expects to file thousands more in the coming months.").
149. See David Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and
Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685,
1706 (2005) ("By filing large groups of bundled claims under the 'John Doe' procedure, obtaining
information subpoenas in the central forum for essentially all the discovery relevant to each
defendant's file trading activity, and then settling individual claims on standardized terms, the
RIAA litigation bears all the hallmarks of an aggregate or mass tort proceeding.").
Defendant class actions are permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but such actions raise due process concerns that are not implicated in plaintiffs' class actions,
and they are very seldom filed. See Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class
Actions, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1319, 1323 (2000).
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The first RIAA case targeted 261 John Doe defendants, with a
promise of thousands more to follow. 15 0 By the time the RIAA ended
its John Doe campaign in late 2008, it had sued more than 30,000
individuals. 1 1 Although the number of actual cases filed did not
approach that number, given the RIAA's practice of aggregating
defendants, the campaign coincided with a substantial increase in the
copyright caseload in the perennially overburdened federal district
courts. By way of comparison, the total number of new copyright
cases filed between 2001 and 2003 was 6,599.152 Between 2004 and
2006, that number swelled to 12,736-a 93 percent increase. 153 New
copyright case filings peaked at just under 14,000 between 2006 and
2008.154 In 2009, following the conclusion of the RIAA's campaign, the
number of new cases dropped back down to approximately the level at
which it had been in 2004.155
The number of new filings has spiked again, however, thanks
in part to the efforts of two law firms that have taken up the mantle
the RIAA laid down in 2008. Operating as the U.S. Copyright Group,
the D.C. area firm of Dunlap, Grubb & Weaver filed suits in 2010 on
behalf of a handful of independent filmmakers alleging infringement
by over 14,000 individual John Doe file sharers. 56 In a single filing,
over 4,500 individuals were sued for using BitTorrent to download the
film Far Cry.157 In another case, 5,000 Does were accused of illegally
downloading The Hurt Locker.'58 Inspired by the U.S. Copyright
Group's business model, a law firm in West Virginia-operating as the
150. See Cassavoy, supra note 148; see also John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers,
CNET NEWS (Sept. 8, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023_3-5072564.html (reporting on the
first case filed in the campaign). Culling information from RIAA press releases, David Opderbeck
compiled a table of filed cases from 2004 and 2005. See Opderbeck, supra note 149, at 1754.
Between 400 and 800 Does were sued every month in 2004. See id. More than 700 Does were
sued every month for seven months in 2005. See id.
151. David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 Years of RIAA
Litigation, WIRED, Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/proving-file-shl.
152. See infra Appendix A.
153. See infra Appendix A. Not all of these cases, of course, were file sharing cases.
154. See infra Appendix A.
155. See infra Appendix A.
156. See Nate Anderson, The RIAA? Amateurs. Here's How You Sue 14,000+ P2P Users,
ARS TECHNICA (June 1, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/06/the-riaa-
amateurs-heres-how-you-sue-p2p-users.ars.
157. See Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co KG v. Does 1-4,577, No. 1:10-
cv-00453, 2010 WL 3522256 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2010).
158. See Complaint,Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-5,000, No. 1:10-cv-00873, 2010 WL
4955131 (D.D.C. May 24, 2010). Other cases filed by the U.S. Copyright Group include: Maverick
Entertainment Group v. Does 1-1,000, No. 1:10-cv-00569 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2010); Call of the Wild
Movie, LLC v. Does 1-358, No. 1:10-cv-00455 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2010); G2 Prods., LLC v. Does 1-
83, No. 1:10-cv-00041 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2010); and Worldwide Film Entertainment, LLC v. Does 1-
749, No. 1:10-cv-00038 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2010).
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Adult Copyright Company and advertising "hardcore protection for
hardcore content"-filed suits accusing some 16,000 John Does of
infringing copyrights in two pornographic films, Batman XXX: A Porn
Parody and Teen Anal Nightmare 2, via P2P networks.'59 Compared
with this recent round of John Doe filings, the RIAA's now-abandoned
ambitions for large-scale P2P litigation seem modest.
Of course, the intent of plaintiffs and their counsel in these
cases is not to litigate the claims to judgment; the goal is to secure a
high volume of quick settlements, transacted online, in the range of a
few thousand dollars apiece. 160 As Julie Cohen noted with respect to
the RIAA litigation, low filing and overhead costs allow these
settlement programs to operate as a profit center for copyright
owners.161 Once an individual John Doe settles by making an
electronic payment and accepting a standardized settlement
agreement drafted by the plaintiffs counsel, he or she is dismissed
from the case and thereby relieved of both the stress of litigation and
the cost of hiring counsel.162 Those who decline to settle are named
and remain on the docket as parties.163
Attempting to scale up copyright infringement litigation by
naming hundreds or thousands of John Doe defendants in a single
action not only makes for unmanageable dockets and a potential
three-ring circus of pre-trial motions, it also creates insoluble due
process problems relating to joinder, venue, and personal jurisdiction.
Citing the "panoply of facts, law, and defenses" presented in a 2004
159. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Porn Industry Lawyer Is New Copyright King with 16,700
Lawsuits Filed, ABA JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/news/articlel
pornindustry_1awyer js new copyright king-with 16700jlawsuitfiled; Greg Sandoval, Porn
Studios to Subpoena Accused File Sharers, CNET NEWS (Oct. 2, 2010), http://news.
cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20018358-261.html; see also Complaint, Third World Media, LLC v. Does
1-1243, No. 3:10cv9O (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, Patrick Collins, Inc v. Does 1-281,
No. 3:10cv9l(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, Collins, Inc v. Does 1-118, No. 3:10cv92
(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, West Coast Prods., Inc., v. Does 1-2010, No. 3:10cV93
(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, West Coast Prods., Inc v. Does 1-535, No. 3:10cv94
(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, Combat Zone, Inc v. Does 1-1037, No. 3:10cv95 (N.D.W.
Va. Sept. 24, 2010); Complaint, Combat Zone, Inc v. Does 1-245, No. 3:10cv96 (N.D.W. Va. Sept.
24, 2010).
160. See USCG v. The People, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.orgluscg
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (describing the U.S. Copyright Group's modus operandi). The U.S.
Copyright Group maintains a web site for subpoena recipients seeking to settle their claims. See
http://dglegal.force.com/SiteLogindglegal (visited Oct. 28, 2010). Although the site is practically
devoid of information, the phrase "All Major Credit Cards Accepted" is displayed prominently.
Id. Visitors to the site can log in and see further information only if they have a "Defendant
Record ID." Id.
161. See Julie Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 17
(2006).
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RIAA case, a district court in Pennsylvania held sua sponte that 202 of
203 John Doe defendants had been improperly joined.164 The court
concluded that "wholesale litigation" of such disparate claims was not
appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that it would be both
"convenient and economical" from the plaintiffs point of view for the
case to go forward. 65 A district court in Florida required severance of
twenty-four out of twenty-five John Does in another RIAA case, citing
unrelated parties and facts, unreasonable prejudice and expense to
defendants, and substantial inconvenience in the administration of
justice.166 Courts in Ohio,167 North Carolina,168 and New York 69 also
severed defendants in RIAA cases, citing the same reasons. Other
courts, including the court in the post-RIAA Far Cry litigation, have
allowed the cases to go forward; these courts have attempted,
however, to streamline the Rule 45 process in a way that is fair to
defendants by requiring the distribution of a court-approved
standardized notice to every Internet user whose IP address is listed
in the plaintiffs subpoena.170 The notice in the Far Cry suit informs
recipients that their identities will be disclosed by their ISPs in thirty
days, unless they elect either to settle the suit or to file a motion to
quash. 7 1 The notice also informs recipients that they may challenge
the court's personal jurisdiction over them. 172
164. BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. 04-650, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8457, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 2, 2004).
165. Id. at *2, *4.
166. Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv-197, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782, at
*17-19 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004).
167. See Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11, No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90183 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008).
168. See Laface Records, LLC v. Does 1-38, No. 5:07-CV-298, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14544 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008).
169. See Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04-cv-2289, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23560 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2004).
170. See Court-Directed Notice Regarding Issuance of Subpoena Seeking Disclosure of
Your Identity, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co KG v. Does 1-4,577, No. 1:10-
cv-00453 (D.D.C. July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Court-Directed Notice], available at http://www.
eff.org/files/filenode/uscg/40-2%2OExhibit%201.pdf; see also, e.g., London-Sire Records, Inc. v.
Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, app. A (D. Mass. 2008) (reproducing the full text of a court-ordered
notice of subpoena).
171. See Court-Directed Notice, supra note 170. Defendants in some of the John Doe file
sharing cases have been given as few as fourteen days to move to quash. See, e.g., London-Sire
Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at app. A.
172. See Court-Directed Notice, supra note 170. In these suits, courts have generally
declined to quash Rule 45 subpoenas for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that such
determinations are premature. See London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 181; Elektra Entm't
Grp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23560, at *20. Courts in the District for the District of Columbia,
where the U.S. Copyright suits are pending, have upheld personal jurisdiction in past file
sharing cases on the rationale that allowing people in the forum to download files via a P2P
network creates sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, regardless of where the computer
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Even if thousands of the defendants in the U.S. Copyright
Group and Adult Copyright Company cases elect to settle at a very
early stage in the litigation, it is all but impossible to imagine how
these cases could progress through discovery as a practical matter;
severance is inevitable. 173 Courts that postpone severance and require
issuance of special notices effectively channel defendants into the
plaintiffs' high-volume settlement apparatus and, by doing so, both
deprive the courts of revenue and provide incentives for massive
(mis)joinder in future cases. 1 7 4
Considering the significant procedural due process and
administration of justice issues associated with mass John Doe
litigation, it is hard to imagine a compelling argument in favor of
adjudicating online copyright disputes in this way. If the defendants
in these suits were severed, the due process problems arising from
mass joinder would be solved, and the courts would collect filing fees
more accurately reflective of the number of controversies over which
they are being asked to preside. Conversely, however, severance
would swell both copyright caseloads for courts and enforcement costs
for plaintiffs.
Simply put, litigation is not a scalable mechanism for dealing
with the high volume of copyright disputes that arise from P2P file
sharing; trying to make litigation scale by aggregating thousands of
defendants in a single suit is efficient for plaintiffs, but the attendant
costs for defendants and the justice system as a whole are
unacceptably high. Including thousands of allegedly infringing files in
a single § 512(c) takedown notice is a workable way of killing lots of
birds with one stone when it comes to hosted content, but including
thousands of defendants in a single copyright infringement lawsuit is
sharing the files and its owner are physically located. See, e.g., Virgin Records, Inc. v. John Does
1-35, No. 05-1918, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20652, at *11-12 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2006) ("[B]y
installing P2P software and logging onto a P2P network, each defendant transformed his or her
computer into an interactive Internet site, allowing others to complete transactions by
downloading copyrighted works over the Internet. Importantly, each Defendant was
disseminating copyrighted works to anyone that wanted them and was downloading copyrighted
works from others who offered them-including residents of this jurisdiction."). For a critique of
this rationale, see Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music
Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049 (2008).
173. Matters concerning severance, including the timing of it, are within the court's
discretion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21 (providing that a court, on motion or on its own, may "at any
time, on just terms, add or drop a party" or "sever any claim against a party").
174. See Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11, No. 1:07-CV-2828, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90183, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2008) (explaining that "a consequence of postponing a decision
on joinder in lawsuits similar to this action results in lost revenue of perhaps millions of dollars
and only encourages Plaintiffs and other members of the RIAA to join (or misjoin) as many [D]oe
defendants as possible").
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not analogously effective in the P2P context. The next Part considers
potentially more scalable mechanisms for P2P copyright enforcement.
IV. MORE SCALABLE ALTERNATIVES: COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. Amendment of § 512(h) versus "Notice and Notice"
Congress could amend § 512(h) of the DMCA to reach § 512(a)
providers; that is, the statute could be amended to permit issuance of
a subpoena upon submission of either a copy of a notice compliant with
§ 512(c)(3)(a) or a notice identifying the IP address of the alleged
infringer's computer, along with information sufficient to establish the
date, time, and content of the allegedly infringing transmission.
Although the season for tinkering with the DMCA to make it
accommodate P2P technologies is probably past,175 such an
amendment would effectively preempt mass John Doe file-sharing
litigation. With an expanded scope for § 512(h), rights owners would
have the ability to identify and contact alleged P2P infringers without
recourse to the courts and Rule 45, which, as Judge Murphy argued in
her dissent in Charter, is precisely how Congress intended the
provision to function with respect to technologies extant when the
DMCA was drafted. 76 While amending § 512(h) to reach users of P2P
networks would raise privacy concerns related to the First
Amendment right to speak anonymously online, the anonymous
speech issue has been litigated time and again in cases involving
motions to quash § 512(h) subpoenas, and courts have consistently
held that the need to identify alleged copyright infringers outweighs
the anonymous speech rights of the alleged infringers. 77 In light of
175. In 2003, before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's
holding in Verizon Internet Services, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard testimony
concerning the applicability of § 512(h) to conduit providers. See Pornography, Technology, and
Process: Problems and Solutions on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003). At the hearing, Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters argued
that Congress should amend the DMCA if necessary to make the subpoena provision reach P2P
providers. See id. (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=902&wit-id=2560 ("It is thus incumbent
upon this Committee and this Congress to see to it that if the judiciary fails to enforce the DMCA
and therefore fails to provide the protection to which copyrighted works are entitled, the
legislature does."). By 2008, the RIAA had given up on lobbying Congress to amend the DMCA to
address P2P file sharing. See Anne Broache, RLAA- No Need to Force ISPs by Law to Monitor
Piracy, CNET NEWS (Jan. 30, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9861460-7.html (quoting
RIAA President Cary Sherman).
176. See Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 778
(8th Cir. 2005) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Elektra Entm't Grp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23560; Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon
Internet Servs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) rev'd, 351 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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these decisions, if Congress were inclined to amend the DMCA to
allow rights owners to identify alleged P2P infringers outside the
litigation context, privacy-based arguments raised in opposition would
be unlikely to undermine the amendment.
Amending § 512(h), however, is neither the only nor the
optimal way of creating a scalable, out-of-court framework within
which rights owners can warn alleged infringers of their potential
liability and thereby deter them from using P2P networks to infringe.
For several years, broadband ISPs have been entering into private
agreements with corporate rights owners under which they have
agreed to pass along notices of infringement to their subscribers. In
2005, the year in which the Eighth Circuit decided Charter, Verizon
agreed to forward notices of infringement for Disney; in return, it
received the right to transmit certain Disney programming over its
network. 178 In late 2009, Verizon agreed to forward notices for the
RIAA. 179 Comcast is also a party to notice-forwarding agreements.180
Through these "notice and notice" arrangements, ISPs can assist
rights owners in enforcing their copyrights in the P2P context without
disclosing subscribers' identities and thereby compromising
subscribers' privacy. 181 Moreover, there is growing evidence that
notice forwarding is actually an effective curb on P2P infringement. 182
178. Nate Anderson, Verizon to Forward RIAA Warning Letters (But That's All), ARS
TECHNICA (Nov. 13, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/11/verizon-to-forward-
riaa-warning-letters-but-thats-all.ars. Some courts have interpreted § 512(i) of the DMCA, which
requires termination of access for repeat infringers, to require all providers seeking safe harbor
to process notices of infringement from rights owners. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
481 F.3d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that § 512(i) requires "a working notification system"),
amended on denial of reh'g, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072,
1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that implementation of a
termination policy is not reasonable where notices of infringement have gone unheeded by the
provider); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(holding that § 512(i) requires adoption and implementation of a procedure for receiving
complaints and conveying them to users).
179. Anderson, supra note 156.
180. See Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Others Deny 'Three Strikes' Piracy Plan,
PCMAG.COM (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2343977,00.asp (reporting
on the Leadership Music Digital Summit).
181. Statutory implementation of notice and notice as an alternative to notice and
takedown has been proposed in the context of Canadian copyright reform efforts. See generally
Michael Geist, The Effectiveness of Notice and Notice (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.
michaelgeist.calcontent/view/1705/125/; see also Michael Geist, All Rights Reserved? Cultural
Monopoly and the Troubles with Copyright, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 411, 430 (2006)
(proposing a "notice and notice" system for Canada modeled on Canada's approach to online child
pornography).
182. See David Carnoy, Verizon Ends Service of Alleged Illegal Downloaders, CNET
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023-3-10437176-93.html ("[The Verizon
representative] also noted that . . . issuing warning letters is proving to be effective."); Greg
Sandoval, AT&T Exec: ISP Will Never Terminate Service on RIAA's Word, CNET NEWS (Mar. 25,
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After Congress declined to amend § 512(h) to overturn the
results in Verizon and Charter, ISPs and rights owners stepped into
the breach to reach a compromise among themselves that serves the
interests of both privacy and efficiency. By dispensing altogether with
pre-litigation subpoenas, the notice-and-notice framework streamlines
P2P copyright enforcement while simultaneously protecting
subscribers' privacy. Copyright owners are afforded a means of
warning alleged infringers, and ISPs can facilitate that
communication without handing over their users' personally
identifying information.
B. Graduated Response and ADR for P2P
Since 2008, trade groups representing corporate rights owners
have been lobbying worldwide for the adoption of graduated response
or "three strikes" protocols as an alternative to mass litigation. 183
Pursuant to these protocols, ISPs either privately agree, or are
statutorily required, to terminate Internet access for subscribers
deemed to be "repeat infringers."184 Several countries, including the
U.K., France, South Korea, and Taiwan, have already incorporated
graduated response into their domestic copyright enforcement
systems.185  Similar legislation is making its way through the
legislative process in New Zealand,186 although E.U. countries
including Germany and Spain have declined to follow suit.187
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10
2 3 3-10204514-93.html ("[An AT&T vice president] said the
notices worked. The company saw very few repeat offenders.").
183. See generally Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of Graduated Response, 26
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Peter Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1373 (2010).
184. See Bridy, supra note 183, manuscript at 2, on file with author.
185. See Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375 (2009)
(discussing graduated response in France, South Korea, and Taiwan). The mandate in the UK is
set forth in the Digital Economy Bill, which became law in April 2010. See Digital Economy Act,
2010, c. 24. The Act provides that technical measures, including protocols for temporary Internet
disconnection, may be phased in by the Secretary of State if a notice regime set forth in the
legislation proves inadequate to reduce the level of online infringement. See DIGITAL ECONOMY
ACT 2010: EXPLANATORY NOTES, J 33-34, available at http://legislation.data.gov.uk/
ukpga/2010/24/notes/division/5/2/data.pdf.
186. New Zealand's graduated response mandate is set forth in the Copyright (Infringing
File Sharing) Amendment Bill, the text of which may be accessed online via the New Zealand
government's web site. See Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill 2010 119-2,
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/billlgovernment/
2 010/0119/latest/DLM2764312.html.
As it was in France, the path to mandatory graduated response in New Zealand is proving to be
a rocky one. See, e.g., Pat Pilcher, So Long Section 92A - New Copyright Bill Revealed, N.Z.
HERALD, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/technology/news/article.cfm?c-id=5&objectid=
10628193 (describing the controversy surrounding the implementation of graduated response in
New Zealand, including the repeal of Section 92A of the Copyright Act, and the introduction of
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In the United States, rights owners have elected not to lobby
for statutorily mandated graduated response, opting instead to pursue
voluntary agreements with ISPs. 158 Such agreements have not come
to fruition, however, as broadband providers have resisted becoming
the entertainment industries' copyright enforcers. 189  Although
domestic ISPs that want to qualify for safe harbor under the DMCA
are already required to adopt and reasonably implement a policy for
terminating the access of repeat infringers, 190 the DMCA does not
define "repeat infringer," and providers have been understandably
reluctant to terminate users' access based solely on repeat allegations
of infringement by rights owners. Whereas ISPs have been willing to
forward notices of infringement to their customers, they have been
unwilling to terminate subscriber accounts in large numbers.
Executives at Cox Communications have acknowledged terminating
account access for a small number of users who ignored repeat notices
of infringement. 191 AT&T executives, by contrast, have said that the
company will not terminate any user's account for copyright
infringement without a court order. 192 Universally, representatives of
the major U.S. broadband providers have denied participation in
graduated response programs and attribute their cooperation with
rights owners to their longstanding obligations under the DMCA. 193
The courts, on which broadband providers should be able to
rely for guidance concerning who is (or is not) a "repeat infringer" for
more user-friendly legislation in the form of the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment
Bill).
187. See Howell Llewellyn, 'Three-Strikes' Off Anti-Piracy Agenda In Spain,
BILLBOARD.BIZ, June 22, 2009, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content display/industry/
e3i8071e0d9c25cb6b876d3771fb7e3d102; Jacqui Cheng, Germany Says "Nein" To Three-Strikes
Infringement Plan, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 6, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
2009/02/germany-walks-away-from-three-strikes-internet-policy.ars.
188. See Bridy, Response, supra note 51, at 82.
189. See, e.g., David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA 3-Strikes Plan, WIRED,
Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-verizon-o ("Two weeks after the
Recording Industry Association of America announced it had struck deals with top internet
service providers to cut off unrepentant music sharers, not a single major ISP will cop to
agreeing to the ambitious scheme, and one top broadband company says it's not on board.").
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006) (requiring service providers to (1) adopt a policy that
provides for the termination of access for repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2)
implement that policy in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy).
191. See Albanesius, supra note 180; Sarah McBride, Relationship Status of RIAA and
ISPs: It's Complicated, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2009, 3:07 PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/
03/26/relationship-status-of-riaa-and-isps-its-complicated.
192. Sandoval, supra note 182 (quoting Jim Cicconi, a senior executive vice president at
AT&T).
193. Albanesius, supra note 180 (reporting that "Comcast, Cox, and AT&T this week
denied that they are participating in a 'three strikes and you're out' anti-copyright
[infringement] program"); Kravets, supra note 189.
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purposes of DMCA compliance, are unhelpfully split on the question.
Some have said that notices of infringement from a copyright owner,
taken on their own, are sufficient to trigger the duty to terminate a
subscriber's access under the DMCA.194 Others have said that such
notices do not provide sufficient evidence of repeat infringement,
because they could be erroneous.195 No court has quantified the
number of infringements that puts the "repeat" in "repeat
infringer."196 Given the lack of judicial consensus on the repeat
infringer question, the relationship between graduated response and
DMCA compliance is murky. While it seems clear that adoption of a
three-strikes-and-you're-out protocol would satisfy the DMCA's
requirement of reasonable implementation of a policy for terminating
the access of repeat infringers, the statute is drafted to give ISPs
latitude in crafting and implementing repeat infringer policies, and
courts have protected that latitude.197 Their decisions track David
Nimmer's suggestion that a mechanical understanding of compliance
with § 512(i) should give way to an objective good faith standard.198
While voluntary adoption of graduated response regimes by
broadband providers would create a scalable, out-of-court framework
for enforcing copyrights in the P2P context, ten years of experience
with the notice-and-takedown regime for hosted content have
demonstrated that there is a significant risk of abuse inherent in a
system that streamlines enforcement by dispensing with the neutral
adjudication of claims. Moreover, the stakes of procedural
194. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(concluding that "an [I]nternet service provider who receives repeat notifications that
substantially comply with the requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A) about one of its clients, but does not
terminate its relationship with the client, has not reasonably implemented a repeat infringer
policy"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 F.3d 751(9th Cir. 2007).
195. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(concluding that notices from a copyright owner function to bring a potential infringement to the
provider's attention, but do not, "in themselves, provide evidence of blatant copyright
infringement" because they could be erroneous).
196. In UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., for example, the court declined to
hold that termination of a user's access was required after a second notice when the first notice
identified multiple alleged infringements. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The
notices in the case were generated by the copyright owner using Audible Magic's filtering system.
Id.
197. See, e.g., Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (stating that "section 512(i) does not require service providers to track users in a particular
way or to affirmatively police users for evidence of repeat infringement"); Corbis Corp., 351 F.
Supp. 2d at 1101-02 (holding that a properly adopted termination policy need not precisely track
the language of the DMCA, and it need not disclose to users the precise criteria the provider will
apply to determine when termination of access is appropriate); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet
Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that § 512(i) "creat[es] room
for enforcement policies less stringent or formal than the 'notice and take-down' provisions of
section 512(c), but still subject to 512(i)'s 'reasonably implemented' requirement").
198. See David Nimmer, Repeat Infringers, 52 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A.167, 221 (2005).
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streamlining are much higher for users when the sanction at issue is
suspension or termination of Internet access as opposed to the
removal of isolated content. The stakes are higher for broadband
providers, too, insofar as suspension of access entails suspension of
revenue.
ISPs, predictably, are vocally opposed to graduated response to
the extent that it requires them to sit in judgment of their customers.
In recent comments to the Office of the Intellectual Property
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), AT&T executive James Cicconi
sharply criticized the notion that ISPs are positioned to fairly and
responsibly administer graduated response protocols:
The government and the courts, not ISPs, are responsible for intellectual property
enforcement, and only they can secure and balance the various property, privacy and
due process rights that are at play and often in conflict in this realm . . . . The notion of
non-governmental players assuming, without legal authority, a governmental role
simply would not endure.
1 9 9
With these risks and stakes in mind, Cicconi recommended that the
government assume responsibility for a "court-administered
adjudication process" that relies upon a "streamlined claims
adjudication body" to resolve civil infringement claims against file
sharers and other alleged online infringers. 200 What Cicconi wants, in
other words, is a specialized form of ADR for P2P-a shift from
litigation to administration roughly analogous to the one that Richard
Nagareda has traced in the mass tort system.201
In the mass tort context, Nagareda views the evolution toward
administrative frameworks for mass dispute resolution partially in
terms of scalability: "The sheer numbers of claims, their geographic
breadth, their reach across time to unidentified future claimants, and
their factual patterns, together, demand the kind of systematized
199. Letter from James W. Cicconi to Victoria Espinel 2-3 (Mar. 24, 2010), available at
http://attpublicpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/ATT-Comments-for-Joint-Strategic-Plan-3-24-
10.pdf; see also Coordination and Strategic Planning of the Federal Effort against Intellectual
Property Infringement: Request of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator for Public
Comments Regarding the Joint Strategic Plan, 75 Fed. Reg. 8137 (Feb. 23, 2010). Eircom,
Ireland's largest broadband provider, controversially agreed in 2010 to privately implement and
administer a graduated response protocol. See Bridy, supra note 183, at *18-19. The agreement
came in settlement of secondary copyright infringement claims brought against Eircom by major
rights owners. See id. For details of the Eircom protocol and its implementation, see id.
199. Letter from James W. Cicconi, supra note 199, at 4..
200. Letter from James W. Cicconi, supra note 199, at 4.
201. See Richard Nagareda, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007). Nagareda
argues that "the evolving response of the legal system to mass torts has been a shift from tort to
administration." Id. at viii. He defines "administration" to mean "an ongoing, institutionalized
regime that sees its subject matter not as a series of isolated events, but, instead, as suitable for
systematic treatment." Id.
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treatment characteristic of administrative processes."202 The elements
of numerosity and geographic breadth, which Nagareda sees as
contributing to the unworkability of a litigation-driven mass tort
system, are also present in a litigation-driven system for adjudicating
claims of P2P copyright infringement. Given these commonalities,
P2P infringement claims, like mass tort claims, may be better
managed administratively than judicially.
1. An ADR System Modeled on ICANN's UDRP
The idea of a dedicated, publicly administered alternative
dispute resolution system for adjudicating online copyright
infringement claims has been raised before. In 2005, Mark Lemley
and Anthony Reese proposed amending the Copyright Act to create a
system modeled on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) for
adjudicating disputes over trademarks in domain names. 203 Under
Lemley and Reese's system, a copyright owner seeking to enforce a
copyright against a P2P infringer could forego civil litigation in favor
of an administrative proceeding before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) in the Copyright Office.2 0 4 Such a proceeding would be limited
to cases in which the copyright owner could produce evidence that the
targeted individual uploaded at least fifty copyrighted works during a
thirty day period-a threshold intended to keep cases of de minimis or
isolated infringement out of the system. 205
In addition to imposing a quantitative threshold, Lemley and
Reese incorporate a qualitative limit on the type of claims to be
decided administratively: Only clear-cut cases would be subject to
administrative adjudication. Any case in which the accused infringer
could present evidence of a genuine factual dispute or a viable claim of
fair use would be kicked out of the system without prejudice to the
complainant's right to bring a civil suit in court. 206  For cases
straightforward enough to remain in the administrative system,
Lemley and Reese build in procedural protections for accused
infringers, including the right to present evidence rebutting
allegations, the right to appeal a finding of liability, and the right to
202. Id.
203. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving
Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005).
204. Id. at 3-4.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id. at 7. In order for the system to work as a true alternative to litigation, the
authors point out that most cases would have to be decided administratively. Id. at 8. Only cases
involving plausible factual disputes or legal defenses would be kept out of the system. Id.
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seek penalties against complainants for bringing frivolous or bad-faith
claims. 20 7 The system scales by foregoing face-to-face argument and
litigation-style discovery, but only in uncomplicated cases, leaving
legitimately contested claims to a forum in which they can be fully
aired. The recognition that hard cases are unsuitable for expedited
adjudication is as much a key to the scalability of the ADR system
that Lemley and Reese propose as the recognition that most file
sharing cases are, both in law and in fact, easy ones.
For ISPs, a key advantage of a system like Lemley and Reese's
is the allocation of responsibility for adjudicating claims of online
infringement to a neutral third party. Another advantage is the
removal of ambiguity concerning who should be counted as a repeat
infringer for purposes of DMCA compliance. Lemley and Reese
attempt to give stable meaning to § 512(i)'s requirement of
termination for repeat infringers by expressly defining a repeat
infringer as any user who is twice found liable in administrative
proceedings. 208 An ISP seeking to remain eligible for safe harbor
under the DMCA would be required to terminate access for any user
who meets this definition. Lemley and Reese attempt to strike a
balance on repeat infringement: To make enforcement more efficient
for rights owners, they do not require civil judgments of infringement
to trigger the ISP's duty to terminate; at the same time, to protect
users from enforcement mistakes and abuses, they do not treat notices
of infringement from rights owners as sufficient to trigger the duty.2 09
To ameliorate the harshness associated with the prospect of "exile"
from the Internet, Lemley and Reese envision a five-year time limit on
termination and a period of public education between the passage of
enabling legislation and the actual implementation of their system. 210
Needless to say, an administrative copyright tribunal designed
to make enforcement scalable in the context of P2P has not become
part of the enforcement landscape in the United States. The role
outlined for the Copyright Office in IPEC's 2010 Joint Strategic Plan
on Intellectual Property Enforcement is strictly supportive and
207. Id. at 2-3.
208. The two-strikes repeat infringer protocol that Lemley and Reese describe may seem
at first glance to be more draconian than the three-strikes protocol advocated by rights owners in
connection with graduated response; however, because Lemley and Reese set a fifty-file
jurisdictional minimum for each administrative claim, a user cannot be designated a repeat
infringer under their protocol without having shared at least a hundred copyrighted files. See id.
at 4.
209. Id. at 13 ("Keying the termination obligation to an administrative finding would
protect the due process rights of those wrongfully accused of infringement without rendering the
repeat infringer provision altogether ineffective.").
210. Id. at 14. A five-year suspension seems unduly long, but Lemley and Reese are not
committed to so long a period.
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educational. 211 Whether the idea of a specialized ADR system for P2P
can gain traction domestically, six years after Lemley and Reese's
proposal and well beyond the peak of the P2P "crisis," may depend on
the perceived success or failure of such systems abroad. The newly
implemented HADOPI system in France is sure to be the bellwether.
2. France's HADOPI System
The seeds for governmentally administered graduated response
in France were sown in 2004, when the concept was first mentioned in
a report of France's High Council of Literary and Artistic Property.212
The report recommended implementation of a system requiring
broadband providers to send a specific number of warnings to users
suspected of infringement, after which a fine would be imposed. 213
When France amended its copyright law in 2006 in compliance with
EU directive 2001/29/CE, requiring harmonization of copyright law
throughout the EU, it did not incorporate graduated response into the
new law. 2 14 Rights owners persisted, however, and the idea soon
resurfaced in a 2007 report sponsored by the French Ministry of
Culture, which proposed the creation of an administrative body that
would oversee a system of warnings and sanctions. 215 French ISPs
initially agreed to the proposal along with other stakeholders, but they
withdrew their support before long, leading supporters of graduated
response to seek a legislative mandate. 216
In 2008, the French Minister of Culture and Communication
introduced legislation creating the administrative body proposed in
the 2007 report. 217 The body, HADOPI, 218 was to be responsible for
implementing a graduated response system in which three warning
letters would be followed by a suspension of the accused subscriber's
Internet access for a maximum of one year.219 Debate over the bill
was intense both inside and outside the French parliament, with the
greatest degree of controversy surrounding privacy and due process
211. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 33, 44-45 (2010).
212. See Thierry Rayna & Laura Barbier, Fighting Consumer Piracy with Graduated
Response: An Evaluation of the French and British Implementations, 6 INT'L J. FORESIGHT &
INNOVATION POL'Y 294, 299 (2010).
213. Id.




218. The acronym translates as the High Authority for the Distribution of Works and the
Protection of Rights on the Internet.
219. Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301.
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issues.220 After passage of the bill in 2009, the French Constitutional
Council ruled that a user's Internet access could not be interrupted on
the authority of an administrative body, without a court order. 221 To
comply with the Council's ruling, the HADOPI legislation was
promptly amended, and the system was reconfigured to include an
accelerated legal proceeding presided over by a judge. 222 The judge
has authority under the amended law to impose an access sanction
without a hearing, but the affected subscriber has the right to an
appeal at which he or she is represented. 223
Notices of infringement in the HADOPI system are generated
by an Internet security and content detection company selected by
rights owners. 224 A notice contains relevant information concerning
the alleged infringement: the IP address from which the files were
available, the ISP of the alleged infringer, and the date and time of
the alleged infringement. 225 The notice is forwarded from the security
company to the copyright owner, who then refers the incident to
HADOPI. 2 2 6 To protect the accused subscriber's privacy, HADOPI
forwards the notice to the subscriber without disclosing his or her
identity to the copyright owner. 227 If a subscriber is alleged to have
infringed on a second occasion within six months of receiving the first
notice, HADOPI forwards a second notice. 228 If a third infringement is
alleged within a year of the second notice, HADOPI refers the matter
to a prosecutor, and a judge can order the subscriber's Internet access
220. See Les Diputes Adoptent la Loi Hadopi, LE MONDEFR, May 12, 2009,
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2009/05/12/les-deputes-adoptent-la-loi-hadopi
1192219 651865.html; Marguerite Reardon, France Ignores EU and Passes Antipiracy Law,
CNET NEWS (May 12, 2009), http://news.cnetcom/8301-1023_3-10238912-93.html.
221. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-590DC,
Oct. 22, 2009, Rec. 179. The original version of the law did not require judicial review.
222. See Loi 2009-1311 du 28 Octobre 2009 relative A la protection p6nale de la propridt6
litt6raire et artistique sur internet [Law 2009-1311 of October 28, 2009 Regarding Criminal
Protection for Intellectual Property on the Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANQAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 29, 2009, p. 18290; see also CODE DE LA
PROPRIfTE INTELLECTUELLE, art. L331-21.
223. See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301.
224. Id. at 301.
225. Id.; see also Quelles informations me concernant sont ditenues par l'Hadopi si je fais
l'objet d'une procedure de rdponse gradule?, HADOPI, www.hadopi.fr/faq.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2011) (explaining what information concerning an alleged infringement is transmitted to
HADOPI by the copyright owner).
226. Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301; see also Rdponse Gradule, HADOPI,
http://www.hadopi.fr/usages-responsables/nouvelles-libertes-nouvelles-responsabilites/reponse-
graduee.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2010).
227. Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301.
228. Id. (citing CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, art. L331-25); see also Comment
fonctionne la rdponse gradude?, HADOPI, www.hadopi.fr/faq.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011)
(explaining the protocol).
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suspended. 229 If the judge determines that the infringement was the
result of a negligent failure on the subscriber's part to secure his or
her Internet connection, the suspension is limited to one month. 230 If
the judge determines that the infringement was not merely negligent,
a one-year suspension may be imposed. 231 If the subscriber wants to
contest the judge's decision to suspend access, he or she can exercise
the right to be heard on appeal. 232
The HADOPI system is still quite new, and it remains to be
seen where along the road the inevitable bumps will arise. In terms of
volume, as many as 25,000 infringements per day are expected to be
reported233-enough to tax even the most streamlined of systems.
Unlike Lemley and Reese's proposed system, which limits
administrative ADR to cases in which a single user is alleged to have
shared fifty or more files at one time, the jurisdiction of HADOPI is
not subject to any minimum volume threshold. Rights owners can
thus funnel every detected infringement into the system, resulting in
a substantial burden.234 The lack of a minimum volume threshold also
means that an accused infringer in France could be subject to
suspension of Internet access after only three isolated file transfers
over a period of eighteen months.
The HADOPI framework, as amended to comply with the
requirements of the French Constitutional Council, shares with
Lemley and Reese's plan the overarching goal of creating an efficient
but fair administrative system for deciding claims of copyright
infringement involving P2P file sharing. Both systems are designed to
alleviate the burdens and delays to all parties associated with
litigation, which has proven not to scale well for adjudicating claims
involving P2P. Both systems attempt to balance the need for prompt,
effective enforcement with the right of alleged infringers to a fair and
neutral adjudication of the claims against them. Neither system
229. Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301 (citing CODE DE LA PROPRIETE
INTELLECTUELLE, art L335-7); see also Comment fonctionne la rdponse graduee?, supra note 228.
230. This can occur, for example, in a situation where the subscriber is a parent whose
child is the accused infringer. See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301 (citing CODE DE LA
PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, art. L335-7-1); Quest-ce que l'infraction de ndgligence caractrisde?,
HADOPI, www.hadopi.fr/faq.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
231. Rayna & Barbier, supra note 212, at 301. During this period, the subscriber remains
responsible for the regular price of the subscription and may not subscribe to another service. Id.
at n.13.
232. Id. at 301-02.
233. See Aymeric Pichevin, French Anti-Piracy Scheme's 25,000 Daily Reports,
BILLBOARD.BIZ, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbizlcontentdisplay/industry/e3ilc
1499752deb3a60al584400533395b0.
234. It may be prudent, from a public relations standpoint at least, for rights owners to
refrain from introducing every isolated report of infringement into the system, focusing instead
on cases in which substantial numbers of files are being obtained and/or offered by specific users.
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manages to preserve all of the due process protections associated with
litigation, but it would be impossible to do so in a scalable way.
Incorporating the right to contest allegations and limiting the
duration of access-related sanctions help to mitigate harms to Internet
users under both systems.
V. CONCLUSION
With each successive iteration, P2P network architecture has
become not only more scalable and efficient, but also more perfectly
adapted to "massive infringement." The key to effective online
copyright enforcement in the P2P context is identifying and
implementing enforcement strategies that are commensurately
scalable. While the DMCA has scaled well with respect to
enforcement of copyrights in hosted content, it has not scaled well at
all for infringements over P2P networks. Rights owners continue to
engage in mass John Doe litigation for convenience and efficiency, but
litigation does not scale well either, particularly when the parties
being aggregated en masse are defendants.
There are, however, litigation substitutes worth exploring,
including voluntary notice-forwarding arrangements between ISPs
and rights owners and streamlined systems of alternative dispute
resolution designed specifically for the P2P context. Such systems,
including the newly implemented HADOPI system in France, are
untried but could succeed in proportion to their ability to honor the
competing values of efficiency and fairness. Any high-volume system
for enforcing copyrights online that is not both "architected" and
implemented to balance these competing values will not scale and
cannot succeed over the long term.
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737

